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Rationality plays a key role in both the study of human reasoning and Artificial Intelligence
(AI). Certain notions of rationality have been adopted in AI as guides for the development
of intelligent machines and these notions have been given a normative function. The notions
of rationality in AI are often taken to be closely related to conceptions of rationality in
human contexts. In this paper, we argue that the normative role of rationality differs in the
human and artificial contexts. While rationality in human-focused fields of study is normative,
prescribing how humans ought to reason, the normative conception in AI is built on a notion
of human rationality which is descriptive, not normative, in the human context, as AI aims at
building agents which reason as humans do. In order to make this point, we review prominent
notions of rationality used in psychology, cognitive science, and (the history of) philosophy,
as well as in AI, and discuss some factors that contributed to rationality being assigned the
differing normative statuses in the differing fields of study. We argue that while ‘rationality’ is
a normative notion in both AI and in human reasoning, the normativity of the AI conception
of ‘rationality’ is grounded in a descriptive account of human rationality.
Keywords: Artificial Intelligence; Cognitive Systems; Philosophy; Human Reasoning;
Rationality; Normativity
1. Introduction
A central component of any discussion of Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI)1 is what is meant
by ‘Intelligence’. Intelligence can be, and has been, cashed out in many ways, and un-
fortunately, there is currently no plausible, complete theory or implementable model of
intelligence. Instead, there is controversy about diﬀerent the so-called “theories of intel-
ligence”, each of which encompasses a diﬀerent taxonomic structure of abilities (cf., e.g.,
(Sternberg, 2000)). In this article, we do not attempt to answer the question “what is
intelligence?” Instead, we focus on one feature that is commonly included in conceptions
of intelligence, namely, rationality.2
1Throughout this article, when referring to ‘AI’ as an object of study and development we refer to work towards
systems performing at the upper end of Nilsson’s continuum: “[A]rtiﬁcial intelligence is that activity devoted to
making machines intelligent, and intelligence is that quality that enables an entity to function appropriately and
with foresight in its environment. According to that deﬁnition, lots of things. . . are intelligent. . . At the other end
[of the extended continuum along which entities with various degrees of intelligence are arrayed] are humans, who
are able to reason, achieve goals, understand and generate language, perceive and respond to sensory inputs, prove
mathematical theorems, play challenging games, synthesize and summarize information, create art and music, and
even write histories” (Nilsson, 2009, p. xiii).
2As a result, we almost entirely omit discussion of a number of related and interesting questions, such as “What does
it mean to attribute intelligence to an artiﬁcial entity?” “What diﬀerentiates intelligence from (mere) knowledge—
can something know many things but still not be ‘intelligent’ in the right sense?” “Can intelligence be explained in
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Rationality itself incorporates both a theoretical or epistemic dimension, concerned
with what is rational to believe and with rational degrees of belief, and practical mani-
festations, regarding what it is rational to do, or to intend or desire to do. Historically,
the theoretical study of rationality, conducted within philosophy and diﬀerent branches
of economics (cf., the ﬁrst chapters of Mele and Rawling (2004)), has been largely con-
sidered to be domain-independent. Recently, the situation has changed as rationality as
a research topic has been introduced into several experimental and engineering sciences,
including AI, taking a more empirical and domain-grounded approach to conceptualis-
ing, studying, and implementing models of rationality. This integration brings with it a
need to explain in what ways the concepts of ‘rationality’ used in these diﬀerent ﬁelds
diﬀer. In particular, we must consider whether the concept is being used normatively or
descriptively uniformly across the disciplines or not.
In this paper we argue that rationality in AI plays a primarily normative role and that
we design intelligent systems, agents, robots, etc.,3 in the way that we do because we
want them to reason or act in a particular way. When we speak of them acting rationally,
we are not simply describing the way that they act, but comparing the way that they act
against some speciﬁc benchmark. This benchmark is closely linked to human- or human-
style rationality. It is not merely that we wish to have agents who can act correctly,
according to some abstract characterisation of correct action, but we would like them to
be able to achieve these actions via the use of reason, and not only that, but to reason
in a human-like fashion.4 This mans that underlying the normative standard in AI is a
descriptive conception of human rationality.
We begin in §2 by looking at how rationality is conceived in AI as a type of utility
maximisation.5 We argue that utility-maximisation is too limited to be an account of
rationality, and that it is better called ‘ethicality’ (the reasons for this choice of term
become clear in that section). We compare the AI conception of rationality with the more
human-oriented conceptions used in psychology, cognitive science, and philosophy in §3.
Once we have established these diﬀerent conceptions, we argue in §4 that the roots of
the normative account of rationality used in AI are grounded in a descriptive account of
rationality in nature (that is, humans). We summarise in §5.
terms of the possession of certain faculties, such as rationality, goal-directedness, utility maximisation, creativity,
etc.?”
3In the following we use any of these (and related) terms interchangeably, usually referring to the entire category
of systems, construed very broadly as entities implementing a perception-action cycle. Exceptions will be clear
from context.
4There clearly are important parts of AI research either operating completely independent from any results on or
models of human intelligence or cognition processes, or aiming to implement forms of general reasoning precisely
avoiding certain characteristics of human reasoning (sometimes even presented as ‘ﬂaws in reasoning’). Examples
of the former type of AI work are current systems for statistics-based or neural machine translation (Koehn, 2009;
Wu et al., 2016) or video summarisation (Song, Vallmitjana, Stent, & Jaimes, 2015), and a perfect reasoner based
on algorithmic probability like AIXI (Hutter, 2007) can be seen as an instance of the latter class of research.
Still, conceptually complementing these lines of work there are several major eﬀorts with human-like reasoning
at their core, for instance, in modelling commonsense reasoning, which is necessarily human-centric (Davis &
Marcus, 2015), or in cognitive architectures and cognitive systems engineering (Langley, 2006). In these contexts
‘rationality’ is often taken as proxy for the notoriously hard-to-grasp notion of ‘intelligence’.
5Throughout the article, selected notions of rationality from diﬀerent disciplines are discussed. While many of the
most prominent paradigms from the relevant ﬁelds are mentioned, the resulting collection is by no means complete.
Instead, emphasis has been put on covering especially popular and/or paradigmatic accounts of rationality which
usually can be taken as examples for an entire class of conceptualisations.
2
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2. Rationality in AI: Rationality as utility maximisation
We begin by ﬁrst making precise how ‘rationality’ is commonly understood by AI practi-
tioners. For many researchers in AI, the long-term scientiﬁc aspiration of their activities
still is what can be called “the mechanization of ‘human-level’ intelligence” (Nilsson,
2006, p. 68), by (re-)creating intelligence within an artiﬁcial system by computational
means. Consequently, the corresponding ﬁeld of study occupies an intermediate status
between an engineering endeavour and a scientiﬁc discipline (cf., e.g., the discussions
in Besold (2013a); Cassimatis (2012)). Given the lack of a precise and implementation-
friendly deﬁnition of ‘intelligence’, AI researchers often use proxies such as rationality.
For example, Russell (2016), in his quest to ﬁnd a suitable formal deﬁnition of intel-
ligence, or the best proxy thereof, identiﬁes rationality as a promising candidate, and
Doyle (1992) in his survey of work at the intersection between (the economic theory of)
rationality and AI claims that a theory of rationality might at some point equal mathe-
matical logic in its importance for mechanising reasoning (cf. (Besold, 2013b) for a more
detailed discussion).
If rationality is a necessary component of intelligence, it follows that this process
of mechanisation will require the re-creation of rationality within an artiﬁcial system.
In order both for this goal to be reached and to know whether it has been reached,
we must have an understanding of ‘rationality’ that is apt for mechanization. Certain
conceptions of rationality have played an important role at diﬀerent turning points within
the development of AI as a science, sometimes emerging from new paradigms within the
ﬁeld, sometimes directly contributing to the creation of new stances and perspectives.
Two especially relevant positions for AI as a whole are epitomised in proposals by Clark
(2003) and Russell (2016).
Clark (2003) deﬁnes rationality in a general way as ‘reason-governed behaviour’ and
provides an overview of such behaviour. He lists as cases in point both robotics (Can
reasoned action be explained without making appeal to inner, form-based vehicles of
meaning? Can there be something like representation-free rationality, i.e., can phenomena
like ‘deliberative reasoning’ or ‘abstract thought’ be explained by a complex of reﬂex-
like mechanisms alone?) and global reasoning (How can ‘non-classical’ forms of human
reasoning, such as non-monotonic, abductive, or analogical reasoning, be accounted for
in AI systems?), among others.
Russell evaluates four diﬀerent approaches to rationality from the history of AI: (1)
perfect rationality (the capacity to generate maximally successful behaviour given certain
background information); (2) calculative rationality (the theoretical capacity to compute
a perfectly rational decision given certain background information); (3) meta-level ratio-
nality (the capacity to select an optimal combination of computation sequence and ac-
tion, with the action selection performed by the computation); and (4) bounded optimality
(perfect rationality additionally accounting for limitations on computational resources)
(Russell, 2016, p. 8). All four notions rely on the basic mechanism of maximising the
expected utility—as captured by a performance measure on sequences of environment
states—of an agent’s actions, making rational behaviour a well-deﬁned function of a task
environment. This account of rationality is teleological, and requires that there be some
end goal that can be successfully attained. Then, the extent to which an AI’s action
directed at a certain goal conforms with our desires, expectations, or requirements of
their actions is the extent to which we say that the AI is acting rationally.
While many AI researchers working on topics relating to rational agency deem the
identiﬁcation of rationality in (possibly artiﬁcial) intelligent agents with utility maximi-
sation as a perfectly suﬃcient characterisation of the concept of rationality in general
3
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(cf., e.g., (Bostrom, 2014)), in this section we show that it is not reasonable to consider
an agent acting in this fashion ‘rational’; instead agents who maximise utility should be
called ‘ethical’ rather than ‘rational’. This will pave the way for us to look at broader
conceptions of rationality, centered around human rationality, in §3.
The idea of utility maximisation as a normative guide to behaviour underlies utili-
tarian (and other broadly consequentialist) moral and ethical theories, in contrast with
Kantian/deontological theories (which give priority to the following of certain types of
rules) or virtue ethics (which emphasises the role of virtues or moral character). Utility
maximisation by itself need not have any moral or ethical quality to it, but as soon as a
normative dimension is introduced and we use it to judge whether a person has acted in
a good or correct manner, it takes on this ethical quality. In a normative context, equat-
ing rational behaviour with utility-maximising behaviour makes it impossible for one to
act rationally but unethically, or ethically but irrationally. Thus, the distinction between
rational and ethical behaviour collapses. If we wish to maintain a distinction between
agents (natural or artiﬁcial) who act rationally and ones who act ethically (and we do),
we must ﬁnd a way to reject the identiﬁcation of rationality with utility maximisation.
One way to object to this line of reasoning is to argue that it assumes that ethical
activity in both the artiﬁcial and natural domain is at root utilitarian, and that in order
to call the behaviour of a utility-maximising robot ‘ethical’ we would have to call the same
utility-maximising behaviour in a person ‘ethical’. Not everyone admits consequentialist
theories of ethics as correct, advocating deontological or aretaic alternatives instead. This
is a reasonable position to take, but it is not an objection to the equation of rational
agents and ethical agents. For in such a case, not only would the utility-maximising
robot not count as an ethical agent, it is unclear whether it would count as a rational
agent—to allow it to do so would be to allow that it can be possible to act unethically
but rationally.6 Thus, we might be happy to admit that rationality entails ethicality, but
there is more to acting rationally (or being rational) than merely acting ethically (or
being ethical), as we can see by transferring the notions from the artiﬁcial domain to the
natural one.
If rationality is nothing more than utility maximisation, in both artiﬁcial and natural
domains, then rationality in people will also be nothing more than utility maximisation.
This is the approach to human rationality that is often taken by economists—in the
so-called homo economicus—in which case rationality then becomes nothing more than
the imposition of certain types of consistency constraints on preferences (cf. (Hammond,
1997)). But to call these consistency axioms the sum of human rationality is to redeﬁne
the term beyond recognition. It simply ignores the broad way in which we use the term
‘rational’ in connection with human behaviour, both descriptively and normatively, and
we would be well within our rights to say that if rationality is to be deﬁned as utility-
maximisation or adherence to certain preference-consistency axioms, then we are not
interested in rationality but rather in whatever we wish to call that faculty or concept
which we call rationality in ordinary contexts. In particular, we would like to have an
account which retains connections with both reason and rationalisability, regardless of
whether we end up calling this phenomenon ‘rationality’ or not. Let us be clear here:
This is not a dispute about terminology, about what it is we should call ‘rationality’,
but about the underlying concept. We are interested in the phenomenon out there in the
world that this word can (or should) pick out, b regardless of whether or not we end up
calling it rationality or something else.
6Whether one would wish to allow this possibility is beyond the scope of our discussion; it is worthwhile pointing
out that there are at least prima facie reasons for not wanting to allow it.
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We therefore relabel agents who act merely in a means-ends fashion as ‘ethical’ ones,
and call agents ‘rational’ who function under a broader concept of rationality which also
encompasses further facets (Cowen, 2004). If we retained the concept ‘rational’ for the
utility-maximising agents, we would then still need to ﬁnd another label for the broader
notion; and it turns out that some people already have: In AI, a distinction is often
made between ‘rational’ agents, which act in a utility-maximising way, and ‘intelligent’
agents in general, with the former being taken as a sub-class of the latter. Following the
hierarchy of agent classes introduced by Russell and Norvig (2003), agent architectures
in AI can be ordered on a scale of increasing degree of (perceived) intelligence and
overall capability level starting from reﬂex agents and ranging through purely goal-based
agents to utility-based agents and learning agents at the upper end. When speaking of
‘rational’ agents, reference is usually made to utility-maximising agents as the second
highest class in the hierarchy. Utility-maximising agents in general are required to come
equipped with a utility function as an internal performance measure, which in the case of
‘rational’ agents additionally has to match the performance measures of the environment.
In this sense, while a utility function might not be necessary for rationality in general,
‘rational’ agents in AI can be modelled (and are expected to act) as if they are governed
by one—thus, for all relevant purposes, becoming equal to ethical agents.
Ny placing rational agents/utility-based agents on the second highest level in their
hierarchy, Russell and Norvig (2003) make it clear that rationality is not suﬃcient for
full intelligent agency. Additionally, subsuming rational agents under the broader class
of utility-based agents also provides evidence that the corresponding description of the
lower-level of agents as ‘rational’ is inappropriate unless rationality would have to be
taken as a sub-notion of utility maximisation. This ailment is cured by instead opting for
an ethical description. Artiﬁcial rationality is generally goal- or action-oriented: If that
goal is utility maximization, then we call the artiﬁcial agents merely ‘ethical’. If, however,
the goal-directed behavior is aimed at a goal other than simple utility maximization, we
will call it rational.
3. Concepts of rationality outside of AI
We have shown that a minimal condition for a conception of ‘rationality’ in AI is that it
allows us to distinguish agents who are rational from ones who are merely ethical. We now
look at how rationality is conceptualised outside of AI, focusing on human-oriented con-
ceptions found cognitive science, psychology, and philosophy. These conceptions include
both normative and descriptive ones.
3.1. Rationality in cognitive science and psychology
In the natural or human context rationality is not generally explicated in an exclusively
goal-oriented way, but also involves notions such as cognitive consistency or adherence to
values. Since Simon’s foundational work on rationality resulting in the notion of bounded
rationality (Simon, 1959), and his contributions to the study of human problem-solving
and high-level reasoning (Newell & Simon, 1972; Simon, 1990), many distinct frameworks
for modelling rationality (and establishing a normative theory) have been proposed in
psychology and cognitive science (cf. Besold (2013b) for more detail). Breaking these
distinct approaches down to their underlying theoretical foundations, we can identify
four main types of models, together with corresponding normative interpretations for
what counts as rational: (1) logic-based models, (2) probability-based models, (3) game-
5
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theoretic-based models, and (4) heuristic-based models. Logic-based models (cf., e.g.,
Evans (2002)) consider a belief as rational if there is a logically valid reasoning process
to reach this belief relative to the corresponding available background knowledge (putting
signiﬁcant emphasis on logical consistency between beliefs and knowledge). Probability-
based models (cf., e.g., Griﬃths, Kemp, and Tenenbaum (2008)) accept a belief as rational
if the expected value of the belief is maximised relative to given probability distributions
of background beliefs (which can either reﬂect a notion of goal-oriented utility, or refer to
the likelihood of a certain belief being accurate given the background beliefs). For models
based on game theory (cf., e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein (1994)) a belief is rational if the
expected payoﬀ of maintaining the belief is maximised relative to other possible beliefs
(which at ﬁrst sight comes closest to an exclusively utility-maximising approach, but as
discussed by Cowen (2004) can encompass numerous additional facets). These models
clearly involve normative conceptions of rationality. In heuristic-based models (cf., e.g.,
Gigerenzer, Hertwig, and Pachur (2011)) classical ideas of normativity within a model
of rationality become obsolete and in many cases are not anymore part of the respective
frameworks.7,8
Although each type of frameworks has gained merit in modelling certain aspects of
human rationality and providing a foundation for experimental studies, the generality
of each class has at the same time been challenged by psychological experiments and
theoretical objections. On the one hand, studies by Wason et al. question the human
ability of reasoning in accordance with the principles of classical logic (Wason (1966);
Wason and Shapiro (1971)). Byrne’s ﬁndings on human reasoning with conditionals also
indicate severe deviations from this classical paradigm (1989). Similarly, when consider-
ing probability-based models, Tversky and Kahneman’s Linda problem (1983) illustrates
a striking violation of the rules of probability theory by human reasoners. On the other
hand, game-based frameworks are questionable due to the lack of a (reasonably) unan-
imously accepted concept of optimality in game-theory. There are numerous proposed
variants of the Nash equilibrium (cf., e.g., Halpern (2008)), and it is not clear which
one—if any—should be taken as ‘the most rational one’ in a given situation. As a result,
we are left with a tension between the norms advanced by the theoretical models and
the descriptive data the psychological evidence provides.
Heuristic approaches to judgement and reasoning follow a diﬀerent approach, and are
often conceptualised as approximations of a rational ideal, rather than an instantiation
of the ideal itself. In some scenarios, heuristics work well and yield surprising results,
but when heuristics are applied in psychology and cognitive science they still often lack
formal transparency and explanatory power. In this respect, this distinguishes the actual
use of heuristics in psychology and cognitive science from the crucial role heuristics play
in AI. In AI, heuristics are frequently derived in a top-down manner from theoretical
7The question for classical normativity as standard for ‘good’ or ‘correct’ reasoning (as still underlying Kahneman’s
and Tversky’s heuristics-and-biases program) becomes mostly obsolete in the case of current heuristic frameworks,
and is replaced by an eﬀort to build models which describe and predict actual human judgments and decision-
making behaviour (cf., e.g., Gigerenzer (1996)), placing heuristic models in the family of descriptive models (cf.,
e.g., Baron (2012)). When talking about the normative approach in this context, the term usually describes eﬀorts
which try to understand under which conditions a given heuristic performs optimal.
8These four families of models for rationality (though partly with exception of the fourth type can actually
be found within existing AI systems and theories. Still, the underlying notions of rationality have stayed close
to their ﬁelds of origin and corresponding deﬁcits and shortcomings have commonly been brought along. In
consequence, AI systems mostly fall short in tasks such as predicting or exhibiting behaviour resembling human-
like rationality or rational action—which would be a crucial pragmatic need in all domains concerned with close
interaction (and possibly even cooperation) between a human user and an AI system. Example scenarios for these
are numerous, ranging from rational agents communication for cooperative dialogues (Sadek, Bretier, & Panaget,
1997) to adaptive and cooperative wheelchairs (Galluppi, Urdiales, Sandoval, & Olivetti, 2009).
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foundations or from practical knowledge about an application domain or task, resulting
in an explicit rule or evaluation function with strong theoretical underpinnings. Such
theoretical underpinnings allow for the analysis of limitations or required preconditions
of the respective heuristic. On the contrary, heuristics in the context of human reason-
ing often have the character of empirically learned ‘rules of thumb’ that lack a strong
theoretical basis. Moreover, the status of heuristics as commonly used mechanisms of
cognition—both across subjects as well as across tasks and individual cases—has been
experimentally challenged (cf., e.g., Oppenheimer (2003)) and theoretical problems re-
lating to complexity and perceived intractability in human decision-making have been
pointed out (cf., e.g., van Rooij, Wright, and Wareham (2010)). Additionally, from a
more general methodological or philosophical point of view, a quite fundamental criti-
cism can be stated: Due to the open nature of the collection of heuristics propagated in
most current accounts (i.e., whenever a phenomenon cannot be covered or described by
an existing heuristic, a new one speciﬁcally ﬁt to the task is introduced), the possibility of
falsiﬁcation and refutation of modeling assumptions and theories is not guaranteed, and
a (reasonable) completion of the model can neither be checked for, nor feasibly assumed
at any point.
Some researchers in cognitive science and decision theory question the completeness
and suitability of the classical approaches to rationality on an even more fundamental
level (echoing many of the intuitions and insights already articulated by Simon in his
theory of bounded rationality). Gilboa (2010)—cf. also Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001)—
deﬁnes rationality to crucially depends on the subject executing the reasoning and (al-
legedly) rational behaviour. In his view “a mode of behavior is rational for a given decision
maker if, when confronted with the analysis of her behavior, the decision maker does not
wish to change it” (Gilboa, 2010, p. 3). Rationality then becomes subject-centred, as
what is considered rational varies with the reasoner in question. If the decision maker
does not understand the analysis or the reasons for which her behaviour is considered
not rational, she cannot be judged as irrational on these grounds. Gilboa argues that
where limited cognitive capacities prevent comprehension of the expected rational rules,
but would always make the reasoner take the same decision again, rationality on the
reasoner’s own terms has to be conceded, notwithstanding an external observer’s dis-
senting judgement. This of course does not exclude the possibility of a reasoner acting
irrationally, or committing an “error in reasoning”, as in many cases individuals will still
fall short of deciding at the best of their respective capacities. The novelty compared
to previous accounts is instead introduced by personalizing the notion of rationality to
that degree that the rational norm has to be achievable for the reasoning subject (given
available cognitive resources, supporting formal tools and corresponding regulated rea-
soning styles such as logical reasoning, etc.) if the subject is to be held accountable
under the norms of rationality. Kokinov (2003) goes even further in proposing that the
concept of rationality as a theory in its own right ought to be replaced by a multilevel
theory based on mechanisms and processes involved in decision-making, due to its fail-
ures as a descriptive theory of human decision-making, and as a normative theory for
good decision-making. Utility-maximisation and rationality would then be rendered as
contingent emergent properties. On such a view, humans are not homo economicus, not
fundamentally.
7
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3.2. Rationality in philosophy
The view of (human) rationality that is found in philosophy is broader even still. It still
includes the instrumental dimension—as Cowen notes, “Philosophers . . . commonly be-
lieve that economic logic focuses on instrumental rationality, as exempliﬁed by a Humean
ends-means logic” (Cowen, 2004, p. 213), but more than goal-oriented or ends-means
behavior is required for a philosophical account of rationality. Alongside instrumental
rationality we may also identify procedural rationality (“do our mental processes for
forming values make sense?”) and expressive rationality (“do we have the right ends or
values”) (Cowen, 2004, p. 213). Human rationality must encompass more than a simple
teleological account because humans, unlike machines, are able to act without any clear
goals in mind. Even in systems built upon BDI (belief, desire, intention) architectures
(Rao and Georgeﬀ (1991)) and the like, which provide artiﬁcial agents with a model
of how human impulse/motivation works, equipping the system with the ability to get
from (models of) beliefs to (models of) intentions and thus to develop its own goals, the
notion of ‘goal’ still remains much more explicit and less ‘subconscious’ than for humans.
This only serves to underscore that there is more to human reasoning and rationality
than simple attainment of goal. Further components that play a role in human rational-
ity include curiosity, free association, creativity, inspiration, as well as more structured
components such as reasoning, rule-following, analogy, etc.9
Stanovich distinguishes two ways in which the concept of rationality is used with regard
to human cognition, a weak sense and a strong sense. The weak sense is descriptive in
nature and derives “from a categorical notion of rationality tracing to Aristotle (humans
as the only animals who base actions on reason)” (Stanovich, 2012, p. 344). This weak
sense is contrasted with a strong sense, how the term is used in cognitive science, and
this sense—which Stanovich never explicitly deﬁnes—is “a normative notion” (Stanovich,
2012, p. 344). The strong sense of rationality is subdivided into two types: epistemic
rationality, which “concerns how well beliefs map onto the actual structure of the world”
(Stanovich, 2012, p. 344), and instrumental rationality, which involves “behaving in the
world so that you get exactly what you most want, given the resources (physical and
mental) available to you” (Stanovich, 2012, p. 345). There is a clear parallel between
this instrumental notion and the utility-maximising account of rationality given in §2,
and indeed Stanovich notes that when the concept of rationality is transferred from
cognitive science to economics, the idea of goal-fulﬁllment is cashed out in terms of
utility maximisation (Stanovich, 2012, p. 345).
Stanovich’s epistemic rationality, the idea that our beliefs can map onto the “actual
structure of the world” in a better or worse fashion, involves not merely how individual
beliefs are mapped onto the world, but how well the structure of beliefs is mapped onto
the structure of the world. Thus, we must inquire into what sort of structure our beliefs
have that is relevant to a corresponding structure in the world. The most natural answer
is that it is the logical structure of beliefs—their inferential relations with each other—
that is at stake. Understanding epistemic rationality this way, the logical structure of
beliefs plays a central role, and the way in which epistemic rationality is demonstrated
9Notions of creativity, curiosity, etc., raise interesting questions (that we cannot pursue here) connected to ‘in-
terestingness’, a constraint that is often put on things like automated theorem provers. We don’t merely want
automated theorem provers to churn out new results, we want these results to both be ones we can understand
and be ones we find interesting (with the caveat that ‘interesting’ is itself a relative term: A mathematical result
can be interesting in one context but be boring or trivial in another). This, unlike questions of rationality which
we have shown above to be normative in nature, is a descriptive requirement. We want theorem provers to give us
results that we are in fact interested in, not ones that we should ﬁnd interesting. This is a subject which deserves
further exploration beyond the scope of this paper.
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is via appropriate performance in reasoning tasks that reﬂect this structure. If utility-
maximising is the benchmark for human (instrumental) rationality, then performance of
certain reasoning tasks is the benchmark for human (epistemic) rationality.
This emphasis on reasoning tasks in connection with rationality has a long history in
philosophy, ed in Aristotle. Recall that Stanovich connects the weak, descriptive sense
of rationality with Aristotle, not his stronger, normative and epistemic sense of rational-
ity. But this is problematic in two respects: First, though the idea of rationality being
speciﬁcally or uniquely associated with humans is indeed usually attributed to Aristotle
in truth it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd any such claim explicitly in his writings.10 Second, this
‘Aristotelian’ conception of rationality is normative, not descriptive.
When discussing human virtue in the Nichomachean Ethics in terms of the soul, Aristo-
tle points out “that one element in the soul is irrational and one has a rational principle”
(Aristotle, 1941a, Bk. I, Ch. 13, p. 950). While the irrational part of the soul is “com-
mon to all species and not speciﬁcally human” (Aristotle, 1941a, Bk. I, Ch. 13, p. 951),
Aristotle does not explicitly say here that the rational part of the soul is not common to
all species and is speciﬁcally human. He is only marginally more explicit elsewhere. In
the Metaphysics, he gives a number of ways in which men are distinguished from other
animals, including living not only with the aid of appearances and memory but also “by
art and judgement” (τέχνῃ καὶ λογισμοῖς) (Aristotle, 1979, Bk. A, ch. I, p. 12).
The use of rationality or reason as a ‘speciﬁc diﬀerence’ of humanity, that is, the
very property by which the species ‘human’ is speciated, is found, instead, in Porphyry.
Porphyry distinguishes three ways in which things can diﬀer: (1) commonly, (2) properly,
and (3) most properly (Porphyry, 2003, §3, p. 8). One object diﬀers from another in the
most proper way when the ﬁrst is distinguished from the other by means of a speciﬁc
diﬀerence, and the example that Porphyry gives is “as a man diﬀers from a horse by a
speciﬁc diﬀerence, that of ‘rational’ ” (Porphyry, 2003, §3, p. 9). Such a diﬀerence is ‘most
proper’ because, unlike common and merely proper diﬀerences, most proper diﬀerences
make two things not only ‘otherlike’ but actually ‘other’. As Porphyry puts it, “when the
diﬀerence ‘rational’ approaches ‘animal’, it makes it other and makes a species of animal
. . . it is in virtue of those diﬀerences which make a thing other that divisions of genera
into species are made” (Porphyry, 2003, §3, p. 9). For Porphyry, not only is rationality
what distinguishes the species humanity from all the other items in the genus ‘animal’,
it is only the species humanity that is characterised by this diﬀerence: Any animal which
does not possess rationality is other than man.
But what is this ‘rationality’ that both Aristotle and Porphyry are discussing? It is the
ability to exercise reason, or indeed simply ‘to reason’. In the Topics, Aristotle says that
“reasoning is an argument in which, certain things being laid down, something other than
these necessarily comes about through them” (Aristotle, 1941b, Bk. I, p. 188), and such
arguments are divided into four types: demonstrations, dialectical reasoning, contentious
reasoning, and mis-reasonings arising from premises speciﬁc to an individual science (for
example when a geometer reasons from incorrect diagrams or deﬁnitions). An argument
is a demonstration when it begins from premises which are “true and primary, or are
such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premisses which are true
or primary” (Aristotle, 1941b, Bk. I, p. 188). Dialectical reasoning is when the starting
premises are “opinions that are generally accepted” (Aristotle, 1941b, Bk. I, p. 188),
while contentious arguments begin from premises which seem to be generally admitted
but are not in fact. Thus, reasoning as Aristotle uses it in both the Topics and the
10Further, as an anonymous referee points out, it is not clear that rationality as Aristotle deﬁnes it is unique to
humans.
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Prior Analytics is deﬁned in normative contexts, telling us how one should reason in a
scientiﬁc context, how one should reason is a dialectical context, and how one should
reason in a contentious or sophistical context. If one excludes contentious reasoning and
‘mis-reasoning’ from the scope of reasoning (and there is evidence that Aristotle does),
then we are left with a deﬁnition of reasoning which is equivalent to good reasoning—a
clearly normative conception of rationality, not a descriptive one as Stanovich assumes.
That the Aristotelian conception of reasoning was understood to be normative can also
be seen in the diﬀerent way in which medieval philosophers characterised the sciences of
logic and grammar; the former is normative while the latter is descriptive. For example,
in this Aristotelian tradition, Anselm of Canterbury distinguishes the usus commune
‘common usage’ of words from their usus proprie ‘proper usage’, associating the for-
mer with the study of grammar and the latter with the study of logic (of Canterbury,
1938–1961; Uckelman, 2009). As a result, it is problematic for Stanovich to connect his
weak notion of rationality with the Aristotelian one, for it is neither speciﬁc to humans
nor descriptive in nature. Instead, the conception of rationality as a capacity to rea-
son correctly encompasses both the instrumental and epistemic aspects, and provides a
normative grounding.
4. The normative and descriptive roles of rationality
Having identiﬁed various ways in which ‘rationality’ has been explicated in both natural
and artiﬁcial contexts, we are now in a position to discuss whether these notions are best
used normatively or descriptively. We aim to show that concepts of rationality that are
predominantly normative in the artiﬁcial context are descriptive in the human context.
There are a number of diﬀerent factors that inﬂuence how we design rational machines,
including ﬂexibility, reliability, rectitude, and user-friendliness. One of the most basic is
a desire for familiarity: We desire the familiar and fear the unknown. When faced with
the unknown, we seek to make it familiar.11 An agent who does not act in a ‘rational’
fashion (however ‘rational’ ends up being cashed out) but instead acts in a chaotic and
unpredictable fashion scares us.
This familiarity is, however, desirable only up to a certain point, after which we enter
the so-called ‘Uncanny Valley’ (Mori, 2012), the descent into eeriness that characterises
the responses people have to human-like robots, which “abruptly shift from empathy
to revulsion as it [the robot] approached, but failed to attain, a lifelike appearance”
(Mori, 2012, p. 98).12 Mori introduced the concept of the uncanny valley with respect to
people’s responses to the appearances of robots (cf. also (Ka¨tsyri et al., 2015, pp. 2–3)),
and the concept has been extended to the feelings of eeriness that arise when there is
a mismatch between the appearance of an AI (such as a virtual character) and how it
behaves (Tinwell, Nabi, & Charlton, 2013). A visual component is not necessary: We
can also consider how people respond to the actions of robots and other AIs, regardless
of their appearance. On one end of the spectrum, if the actions of a system are too
far removed from human activity, such that they cannot be predicted or understood,
then that very unpredictability will induce fear. But on the other hand, if these actions
approach but do not attain a human-like characterizability, then we may ﬁnd ourselves
yet again in the uncanny valley. We return to this complication below.
11Such as, for instance, when we impute a concept of causality onto the world, as Nietzsche argues we do (Nietzsche,
1967, p. 551).
12The empirical evidence for the uncanny valley hypothesis remains inconsistent (Ka¨tsyri, Fo¨rger, Ma¨ka¨ra¨inen, &
Takala, 2015, p. 1).
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A further component in our desire to create artiﬁcial agents that are rational in a
human-like way is that the only commonly acknowledged examples for rationality—
usually taken to be indicated indirectly but reliably through an agent’s corresponding
‘intelligent’ or ‘rational behaviour’ (Newell (1982); Russell (2016))—can be found in hu-
man reasoning. From this observation stems the widespread assumption, often taken for
granted without further justiﬁcation, that (re-)creating human-style reasoning within an
artiﬁcial system will also result in a (re-)creation of human-level capacities and mental
faculties (Langley, 2012). Indeed, this recreation of human-like reasoning has been part
of the deﬁnition of AI since the beginning. In using re-interpretations of the ‘imitation
game’ as basis for his foundational proposal of how to characterise machine intelligence,
Turing (1950) placed human-likeness of the machine’s manifested behaviour and (ob-
servable) reasoning processes and outcomes at the core of AI.13 In equating (or rather
replacing) the question “Can machines think?” (Turing, 1950, p. 433) by the well-known
imitation game counterparts involving a human and an artiﬁcial player, Turing estab-
lished indistinguishability of the computer’s game playing from its human opponent’s
performance—of which rationality and corresponding reasoning behaviour form an im-
portant element that can easily be tested given the language-based nature of the games.
And indeed, for example Besold (2013c) explicitly proposes human-like rationality as one
of the four constitutive “SubTuring challenges” in a deconstruction of the original Turing
Test into more speciﬁc subtasks.
The desire for intelligent machines to behave like ourselves is rooted in more than just
a desire to minimise fear. There are practical reasons to require human-like rationality in
agents when it comes to human-robot or human-computer interaction. In order for us to
successfully interact with machines, they must be suﬃciently like ourselves to be compre-
hensible. The importance of human comprehensibility of AI systems has very recently
been emphasised by Forbus (2016), who makes a case for AI as a research endeavour
being equivalent to learning how to create smart software social organisms which exhibit
increasing abilities to participate in human culture and daily life. The comprehensibility
of the system’s behaviour and outputs is paramount in this context, since eﬃcient com-
munication is a necessary condition for enabling participation in human society. In more
technical contexts, the importance of making a system’s decision and reasoning proce-
dures recognisable and comprehensible for humans has been emphasised. For instance
in the study of classiﬁcation models (Freitas (2014); Letham, Rudin, McCormick, and
Madigan (2015)) improved comprehensibility of the model is considered to have positive
impact on the trust users have in the resulting predictions in domains such as medical
decision-making. Tying these general observations back into a rationality context, But-
terworth and Blandford (1999) propose that an approach to reasoning about interactive
behaviour can be based on the assumption that computer users are rational, and that the
behaviour of the interactive system as a whole results from the rational behaviour of the
users in combination with the programmed behaviour of the system’s parts. Of course,
the reliability of such an approach depends on the quality of the rationality model, and
the latter’s suitability for such a use—where comprehensibility of the system’s reasoning
and the resulting behaviour can safely be considered one of the crucial factors.
The foregoing discussion then gives us an insight as to where the normativity of ratio-
nality in the context of AI comes from. It is rooted in some concept of human rationality
and the desire for machines to act in a way suﬃciently similar to humans to enable pro-
13This holds true for both modiﬁcations of the original game setting proposed by Turing (1950), the Original
Imitation Game Test and the Standard Turing Test (using the terminology introduced by Sterrett (2000)). On the
relation of both re-interpretations and the respective role of human-like performance in this context, cf. Besold
(2013c).
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ductive interactions with them as well as to remove the fear of the unknown. We want
AI agents to be not only able to make good arguments but also to be able to listen to
them.14 Now that we have a normative concept of rationality in humans, and an under-
standing of how the desire for normativity comes about in the context of AI, we are in
a position to see how the human counterpart matches up to the normative concept of
rationality in artiﬁcial agents. We now argue for a surprising conclusion, namely that
the normative concept of artiﬁcial rationality is rooted not in the normative concept of
human rationality, but in a descriptive one.
First, it is important to note that the Aristotelian-medieval tradition, wherein humans
are by definition rational, still nevertheless leaves open the possibility for humans to act
irrationally. For example, Paul of Venice (early 15th C) describes the view of one of his
opponents as “irrational” without thereby implying that his opponent is inhuman15, and
half a century earlier Gregory of Rimini also describes a view of his opponent as “entirely
irrational” (Maieru`, 1981, p. 483). That humans can fail to act in an entirely rational way
has long been admitted: That they often fail to act in an entirely rational way began
to be increasingly demonstrated in the 1960s and on (cf., e.g., the familiar results of
Wason’s selection task mentioned in §3), with various results showing that how people
do reason and how people should reason often fail to match up.16 It was then, not in
Aristotle or his commentators, that a shift towards a descriptive approach to rationality,
the type of rationality which Stanovich describes as “weak”, arose, but rather in more
modern attempts to characterise how it is that humans actually reason.
What then, is the relationship between these diﬀerent accounts of human rationality
and artiﬁcial rationality? In particular, are both conceptions of rationality to be un-
derstood normatively? If not, then from what does the asymmetry between artiﬁcial
rationality and natural rationality arise? Recall the notion of the ‘uncanny valley’ that
we discussed above: Part of what underpins the normativity of rationality in artiﬁcial
contexts is the desire that our artiﬁcial agents work in a way that is similar to us so as to
escape falling into that valley. If, however, humans do not, generally, attain the normative
standard of rationality that is proposed, then the concept of human rationality which is
being used as the benchmark for the normative standard of artiﬁcial rationality must be
a descriptive one: Because humans fall short of perfect rationality, a perfectly rational
machine would almost immediately fall victim to the uncanny valley.17 This holds for
any normative concept of human rationality that humans in actuality fall short of. If we
aim to stay out of the uncanny valley by ensuring that our AIs reason in a human-like
fashion, then the AIs will also fall short of that normative standard. If they didn’t, then
they wouldn’t be reasoning in a human-like way. In summary, in order to call a machine
‘rational’ (or, by extension, ‘intelligent’), we want it to reason as we do rather than as we
ought.18 This diﬀerence, thus, is mostly pragmatically motivated by the diﬀering needs
14Thanks to an anonymous referee for this lovely analogy.
15“This reply seems irrational to me” (of Venice, 1978, pp. 142–143).
16Various explanations of this fact have been produced, such as that humans are ‘bad’ at reasoning logically
because we haven’t actually identiﬁed the right logical constraints or logical system, perhaps due to the fact that
human interaction and reasoning is so contextualised that taking into account all the relevant contextual factors
in a general way in order to capture ‘good’ and ‘bad’ human reasoning is extremely diﬃcult (an assumption
underlying, for instance, the work of Varga, Stenning, and Martignon (2015)), because there are evolutionary
factors at play (cf. Nowak, Page, and Sigmund (2000)’s explanation of empirical evidence for how humans play
the Ultimatum Game), or because the function of reasoning itself might have to be reconsidered and reframed
(cf., for example, Mercier and Sperber (2011)’s proposal for conceptualising reasoning as argumentation-centric in
nature).
17Accordingly, for instance the already mentioned SubTuring rationality task proposed by Besold (2013c) explicitly
targets rational reasoning as observed in humans.
18In advocated this, note that we are happy to exclude the case of, say, a pocket calculator, which we do not care to
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and purposes a concept of rationality has to serve in either context.
Recognising this helps us account for a perhaps puzzling fact, namely that when we
speak of ‘Artiﬁcial Intelligence’, we are appealing to some, perhaps ill-deﬁned, notion of
human intelligence. Setting aside the question of metrics (how to measure the intelligence
of a non-human subject), we might think it strange that the normativity of rationality in
the artiﬁcial context is essentially rooted in the fact that we deﬁned artiﬁcial intelligence
to be “intelligent like us”. There is no in-principle reason why this should be so; in
fact, there is antecedent reason to think that perhaps the aim of AI researchers is to
develop a concept of intelligence that is supra-human, going beyond our current capacities
(cf. Yampolskiy and Fox (2012)).19 However, the mismatch between the normative and
descriptive conceptions of rationality in humans provides us with an explanation: The
very fact which motivates the normativity of rationality in AI is the same fact which
requires that we use the descriptive account of human rationality as the benchmark.
This also provides an explanation for the set-up of the various types of Turing tests,
which are designed to incorporate how people actually act, rather than how they should
act. A perfectly rational machine would almost certainly fail the Turing test.
5. Conclusion
We end this paper without giving any clear-cut deﬁnition of rationality. If the reader takes
away nothing else from the paper, we hope that they agree that giving such a deﬁnition
is extremely diﬃcult. Beyond that, because of the diﬀerent roles that the notion plays in
diﬀerent disciplines, it is important that one does not carelessly transfer deﬁnitions and
models from one discipline into another: What may be suitable in the context of speaking
of human rationality may not be suitable for discussing rationality in AI, for even if the
concepts used are the same, whether they are being applied normatively or descriptively
may diﬀer. Similarly, when one is building a new model or a new implementation, care
should be taken that the correct conception is being used in the correct way.
An asymmetry between the respective notions of rationality in a human and an ar-
tiﬁcial context has become apparent. While disciplines studying rationality in humans
commonly apply a normative concept based on one of several theoretical rationality
frameworks, the normative standard for artiﬁcial rationality arguably is—and has to
be—a descriptive concept of human rationality. As pointed out in §4, ‘human-likeness’
has been a desideratum for artiﬁcially intelligent agents since the early days of AI re-
search. This also is the case for the agent’s reasoning capabilities and reasoning-based
behaviour, and thus for the notion of rationality for AI.
Acknowledgements
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call either rational or intelligent, and thus do not care how it arrives at its results, so long as it gives us the correct
results. More problematicly, perhaps, this excludes projects explicitly aiming at implementing ‘rational agents’ in
the strong, dedicatedly mathematical sense—rather than general human-level intelligent systems as encompassed
by the deﬁnition borrowed from Nilsson (2009) at the beginning of §1—like, for example, the already mentioned
AIXI model (Hutter, 2007).
19After all: When leaving the potential explanatory dimension of AI with respect to cognitive phenomena aside
(which some researchers as, for instance, Mi lkowski (2013) anyhow consider as at best limited), there seems to be
no urgent need to construct more agents whose capacties are equal to ours. We can create those through natural
means.
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